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Panarchy and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop
and Back Again
Bradley C. Karkkainen*
I. PANARCHY AND PROGRESS
I am both honored and a bit humbled to comment on C.S.
“Buzz” Holling’s contribution to this issue. Holling’s influence
on environmental and natural resources law and policy over
the past several decades has been enormous. Holling pioneered
the concept of “adaptive management”—or Adaptive
Environmental Assessment and Management (AEAM) as he
first dubbed it in his seminal 1978 work on the subject1—as a
scientifically defensible, learning-by-doing, incremental and
iterative approach to improving our understanding of complex
ecosystems, leading to improvements in our ability to manage
environmental problems in their proper ecological context.
Holling developed the adaptive management concept in
response to his own frustrations as a scientist and frequent
participant in interdisciplinary environmental impact
assessment (EIA) teams in the 1970s.2 The standard EIA
approach calls for a comprehensive and synoptic environmental
analysis and assessment, legally required as a prerequisite to
any governmental action that “significantly affects”
environmental quality.3 Typically, however, only a fraction of
© 2005 Bradley C. Karkkainen.
* Professor and Henry J. Fletcher Chair, University of Minnesota Law
School.
1. See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S.
Holling ed., 1978).
2. Id. at 1-2.
3. See National Environmental Policy Act §102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C) (2000) (requiring federal agencies to “include in every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement” on environmental impacts and alternatives to the
proposed action).
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the information needed to make such a comprehensive
assessment is readily available. Data gaps are pervasive,
scientific understanding of even the most basic ecological
processes is often incomplete, and the integrative analyses rest
on crude, untested, incomplete, and necessarily speculative
ecosystem models stitched together from spotty data and
disparate scraps of research findings from a variety of scientific
disciplines. Worse, the validity of the predictions generated by
these models is rarely tested against real-world outcomes due
to a paucity of post-project monitoring.
Consequently,
scientists have little opportunity to refine or adjust their
models over time.
Holling believed such efforts led neither to better scientific
understanding nor to well-informed agency decisionmaking.
For their part, agency managers seemed to have little concern
for the accuracy of the assessments generated by this jerryrigged process, so long as the legally mandatory procedures
were followed.4 As a legal matter, it is procedure and not
substance that matters in environmental impact assessment in
the United States.5
A more scientifically defensible approach, Holling argued,
would be to treat environmental impact assessment not as a
once-off, purely predictive exercise, but rather as an ongoing,
interdisciplinary, scientific inquiry.6 Teams of scientists would
construct integrative models based upon the best data and
research currently available, then identify gaps and
uncertainties in their models and generate testable hypotheses
designed to fill the gaps and reduce the uncertainties. Working
with managers, the scientists would then design management
interventions as scientific experiments carefully tailored to
4. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, at
iii (1997) (concluding that many agencies act “as if the detailed statement
called for in the statute is an end in itself, rather than a tool to enhance and
improve decision-making”).
5. See A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213, 239 (2004) (describing NEPA as a “striking
example of the dominance of procedure over substance,” a condition traceable
to early court decisions holding that only the statute’s procedural provisions
were judicially enforceable).
6. See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT,
supra note 1, at 133 (“Prediction and traditional ‘environmental impact
assessments’ suppose that there is a ‘before and after,’ whereas environmental
management is an ongoing process. . . . Environmental assessment should be
an ongoing investigation into, not a one-time prediction of, impacts.”).
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field-test their hypotheses against observed outcomes. The
results of these “adaptive management” experiments would
feed back into further refinements of the ecological models,
generating subsequent rounds of testable hypotheses. Iterative
application of this method, Holling argued, would lead to
rolling improvements in scientific understanding and
contribute in turn to better informed and continuously
improving management decisions.7
It took the better part of two decades for the adaptive
management concept to catch on in natural resources
management, and we are yet to appreciate its full implications.
Although many leading scientists and natural resources
management professionals now see the need for some form of
adaptive management as axiomatic,8 even the most well-funded
and technically sophisticated ecosystem management efforts,
like those in the Florida Everglades and the San Francisco
Bay-Delta, are still struggling, often awkwardly and
uncertainly, to integrate adaptive management principles.9
Environmental law and policy scholars are several steps
7. See id. at 11-16 (describing principal elements in an Adaptive
Environmental Assessment and Management approach).
8. See Fred Bosselman, A Role for State Planning: Intergenerational
Equity and Adaptive Management, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 323-25
(2001) (describing rising prominence of adaptive management in ecological
science); A. Dan Tarlock, Putting Rivers Back in the Landscape: The Revival of
Watershed Management in the United States, 6 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 167, 189-92 (2002) (describing the shift in natural resources
management toward regional ecosystem-scale efforts at integrated
management, predicated upon adaptive management strategies).
9. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON RESTORATION OF THE
GREATER EVERGLADES ECOSYSTEM, ADAPTIVE MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT
FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE EVERGLADES RESTORATION PLAN 9 (2003)
(concluding that monitoring, assessment, and passive adaptive management
plans for the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Project are scientifically
defensible, but should be augmented with active adaptive management and
measures to ensure that information reaches key decisionmakers); Thomas T.
Ankerson & Richard Hamman, Ecosystem Management and the Everglades: A
Legal and Institutional Analysis, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 473, 500 (1996)
(concluding that “the implementation of adaptive management policies is
problematic [in the Everglades] under the current environmental regulatory
framework” which is predicated upon a static approach to environmental
management); J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously: A Case
Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KANSAS L. REV. 1249, 1265-67
(2004) (stating that despite its professed commitment to an adaptive
management approach, the CALFED Bay-Delta program recently
acknowledged that it had failed to conduct regular status monitoring on the
endangered Delta smelt, a necessary predicate for meaningful adaptive
management).
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further behind the curve. We are only now beginning to debate
the meaning and merits of adaptive management in a serious
way and to appreciate the profound and far-reaching challenge
it poses to more familiar fragmentary, fixed-rule approaches to
law and regulation. J.B. Ruhl’s contribution to this issue is an
important intervention in that debate,10 which I discuss below.
Now Buzz Holling has come forth with a new and equally
revolutionary concept, “panarchy.” I confess that at first blush
I am not entirely certain what to make of it, and suspect I am
not alone in that regard. Perhaps we legal scholars are just a
bit slow on the uptake, but Holling appears once again to be
way out ahead of us, setting his sights on some distant and
dimly perceived horizon of knowledge. And as with adaptive
management, it may take us another twenty years to catch up.
Holling, if you will pardon the analogy, is the Lance Armstrong
of the adaptive change cycle; we feel privileged just to be
somewhere far back in the pack chasing him, however futile
may be the effort to catch him.
“Panarchy,” as Holling and his colleagues describe it, is a
cycle of adaptive change, proceeding through “forward-loop”
stages of innovation, growth, exploitation, consolidation,
predictability, and conservation, followed by “back-loop” phases
of instability, release, collapse, experimentation, novel
recombination, and reorganization.11 At that point the cycle
begins anew, moving once again through the forward loop,
albeit beginning from a new starting point. Holling and friends
schematize this cycle by simplifying it to four phases:
exploitation, conservation, release, and reorganization.12 This
cycle, they argue, generally characterizes processes of adaptive
change in both ecological and social systems.13
So far, so good. From there, though, the story becomes
vexingly complex. These adaptive cycles, Holling tells us,
operate simultaneously on multiple spatial and temporal
scales, and across scales.
Consequently, “major learned
10. J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 21 (2005).
11. See C.S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience and Adaptive
Cycles, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND
NATURAL SYSTEMS 25, 33-40, 47-49 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds.,
2002) [hereinafter PANARCHY]; C.S. Holling, From Complex Regions to
Complex Worlds, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Complex
Regions].
12. Holling & Gunderson, supra note 11, at 34 fig.2-1.
13. See id. at 62.
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benefits need not, and generally do not stay in the place where
they were created,” but instead “flourish elsewhere.”14 Thus
successful local-scale innovations might create new
opportunities that are absorbed into larger forward-loop
learning processes, and become diffused across larger spatial
and temporal scales. By the same token, collapse at small
scales might contribute to cascades of destabilization and
collapse across larger scales. Or, locally adaptive successes
might in some circumstances prove disruptive of larger scales
of forward-loop self-organization, triggering a flip into backloop instability and collapse at the larger scale.15
Holling and his colleagues claim to have documented the
recurrence of these cyclical patterns in numerous ecological
settings,16 and they cite a variety of social science literature
and anecdotal accounts to argue that the pattern is generally
replicated in human social systems as well.17
Ultimately, of course, the panarchy thesis rests on a series
of large empirical claims. Those claims, while plausible and
intriguing, are difficult to verify or to rebut from the vantage
point of a law professor’s desktop, and therefore I have no
choice but to remain agnostic—at least for now. A few
comments are nonetheless in order.
The panarchy thesis, as I understand it, is posited as a
general characteristic of cycles of adaptive change. This lends
a note of determinism and inevitability, something like an Iron
Rule of the Figure-8 (or “double-loop”) pattern of system
change. Holling and colleagues are quick to disclaim a strongly
deterministic interpretation of their own thesis, labeling it a
“metaphor” rather than a “rigid, predetermined path.”18 But a
14. See Complex Regions, supra note 11, at 4.
15. See Holling & Gunderson, supra note 11, at 60-61 (arguing that locally
adaptive strategies may sometimes have maladaptive large-scale
consequences, as when efforts to stabilize resource production reduce diversity
and resilience, leading to collapse in the larger system).
16. See id. at 35-38 & box 2-2 (describing this adaptive change cycle in
several ecosystem contexts).
17. Id. at 38, 55-60 & box 2-5 (describing adaptive change cycle in
corporate management); Fikret Berkes & Carl Folke, Back to the Future:
Ecosystem Dynamics and Local Knowledge, in PANARCHY, supra note 11, at
121-46 (describing panarchic adaptive changes cycles in local and traditional
natural resources management regimes).
18. See Holling & Gunderson, supra note 11, at 51 (“The adaptive cycle in
its most general form is a metaphor and should not be read as a rigid,
predetermined path and trajectory—for ecosystems at least, let alone
economies and organizations.”).
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metaphor for what? Presumably, it is a metaphor for an
observed phenomenon that, according to their thesis, recurs
with predictable regularity. Holling’s own writings elsewhere
suggest that the exact course and direction that change takes
in any particular complex dynamic system will necessarily be
unpredictable, nonlinear, and stochastic,19 yet the panarchy
thesis seems to imply that change, however unpredictable in
the particulars, will always (or almost always) follow a familiar
and predictable progression of steps. The pattern, and the
pattern alone, is presented as certain and more or less
inescapable. Why that should be is never fully explained. To
that extent, although highly abstract, the panarchy thesis
seems a bit undertheorized.
Next, it is not entirely clear what to make of the role of
human agency in a panarchic world, especially as it applies to
human social systems. Certainly we humans play a pivotal role
in social systems—and for that matter, in most ecological
systems, too, given our power to dominate and displace other
species and to disrupt or alter ecological processes.20
Sometimes our impact stems from, or at least is modified by,
conscious, intelligence-informed acts. Presumably, then, our
understanding of the dynamics of system change itself has the
potential to change the way we act within the system, thereby
altering the trajectory of system change—though perhaps,
given complexity, nonlinearity, and inherent stochasticity, in
ways we cannot entirely predict or control. Holling and
company do not tell us much about this, sometimes writing as if
it is simply all beyond our ability to comprehend and manage,
and we are all just along for the ride on the “Double Loop
Panarchy Express.”
19. See C.S. Holling, Fikret Berkes & Carl Folke, Science, Sustainability,
and Resource Management, in LINKING SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS:
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS FOR BUILDING
RESILIENCE 342, 352 (Fikret Berkes et al. eds., 1998) (stating that natural
resources management problems exhibit “aspects of behavior [that] are
complex and unpredictable and . . . causes, while at times simple (when we
finally understood), are always multiple”); see also id. at 346-47 (stating that
in complex natural systems “uncertainty is high,” “knowledge of the system we
deal with is always incomplete,” “[s]urprise is inevitable,” and “the system
itself is a moving target”).
20. See Frances Westley et al., Why Systems of People and Nature Are Not
Just Social and Ecological Systems, in PANARCHY, supra note 11, at 104
(describing competing theories of human domination of ecosystems, all
predicated upon our unusually large capacity to change or destroy the natural
environment).
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The implications seem pretty scary. It is a bit like being
trapped on a twenty-first century, high-tech version of a
double-looping carnival ride, armed with the capacity to fiddle
with the precise trajectory but only in ultimately unpredictable
ways, and never able to change the basic pattern of our
interminable trip: forward, up, around, down, back loop, down,
around, up, forward again, and the more we try to adjust
course, the more the pattern stays the same. It sounds like a
mad ecologist’s vision of a living hell, a Huis clos21 of adaptive
change.
Holling’s earlier work on adaptive management left more
room for optimism. It gave us affirmative reasons to embrace
epistemic humility. Recognition that ecological systems are
simply too complex to fully comprehend may have seemed
debilitating at first, given a culture of regulation and resource
management that assumed it was the regulator’s or manager’s
responsibility to have all the scientifically “correct” answers
before proceeding. Complexity thus initially threatened to
thwart action. Adaptive management seemed to offer a way
out of that box: an incremental, scientifically defensible, onestep-at-a-time methodology for learning as we go, and adjusting
management measures to incorporate gains in knowledge over
time.
Panarchy, on the other hand, conjures up not only intricate
layers of impenetrable and seemingly unmanageable
complexity, but also a sense of futility, coupled with less clarity
and optimism about how to respond. The panarchy thesis
seems to imply that all directed, “forward-loop,” human social
endeavors—adaptive ecosystem management included—are
doomed to fail eventually, perhaps after an initial period of
success. Despite our best efforts, the cycle from innovation
through growth, exploitation, maturity, stability, and
conservation appears destined inevitably to stumble into the
back-loop of destabilization, disorder, and creative destruction.
Every project, large or small, thus takes on an aspect of the
labor of Sisyphus—or Bill Murray’s Groundhog Day without
the happy ending,22 if your tastes run more to pop culture—but
21. The reference is to Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialist play Huis clos
(translated as “No Exit”) in which three characters are condemned to spend
eternity sitting on a couch conversing, even though they cannot stand each
other.
22. Groundhog Day, a 1993 film directed by Harold Ramis, starred comic
actor Bill Murray as a television weathercaster doomed to spend eternity in
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either way, it is a gloomy prospect. If indeed all human
undertakings are doomed to fail at unexpected times and for
unanticipated reasons, why bother? Unless, of course, we are
so biologically programmed that we have no other choice, which
is an equally dismal thought.
But what about the “back loop” of the panarchic cycle?
That idea has great intuitive appeal. We have all seen cycles of
creative destruction, alternating with periods of incremental
front-loop learning. The front loop imposes order and stability
(at least for a while), but at the same time grows increasingly
vulnerable to disturbance until suddenly everything unravels
in a flurry of rapid, back-loop, creative disorganization,
reorganization, and reconfiguration, leading to innovation, resynthesis, and a new front-loop developmental pattern. It is on
the back loop that the most creative and far-reaching changes
are often inaugurated in the midst of seeming chaos and
disintegration. This is no less true in law than in other fields of
human endeavor. It took the American Revolution and a
subsequent period of futility under the Articles of
Confederation (back loop) to spawn a long period of relative
stability under the United States Constitution (front loop); the
Civil War (back loop) to generate the Reconstruction
Amendments, a long period of slowly accumulating federal
constitutional primacy, and steady advances in civil rights and
civil liberties (front loop); the Great Depression (back loop) to
produce the New Deal and the modern administrative and
regulatory state (front loop).
In the environmental arena, too, it is typically periods of
crisis that stimulate creative and innovative advances in policy
and management. Thus it took the Santa Barbara Channel oil
spill and the Cuyahoga River bursting into flames (back loop)
to bring about the Clean Water Act (front loop),23 Love Canal to
produce CERCLA,24 Bhopal to launch the Toxics Release
Inventory,25 and the Exxon Valdez to spur enactment of the Oil
Collaborative, adaptive, and integrative
Pollution Act.26
endless repetition of the worst day of his life, covering the annual emergence
of the groundhog in a backwater town—until the inevitable happy ending.
23. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental
Command and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 206 (2001).
24. Id. at 206 n.83.
25. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Third Way Environmentalism, 48 U.
KAN. L. REV. 801, 818 (2000).
26. See Vandenbergh, supra note 23, at 206 n.83.
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environmental governance institutions have emerged in places
like the Florida Everglades only when it became clear that
incremental business-as-usual was not working, the center
would not hold, and something radically new and different
needed to be tried.27 In short, we appear to be most open to
experimentation and new thinking when we are desperate and
no longer can see the way to answers through accustomed
modes of thought and familiar patterns of action. Perhaps that
is where, at the end of the day, a glimmer of hope is to be found
in panarchy.
My friends and sometime collaborators, Chuck Sabel and
Bill Simon, have written provocatively about a legal approach
they call “destabilization rights.”28 In Sabel and Simon’s view,
sometimes it becomes necessary to use litigation to pull the
plug on an established institutional arrangement when it
becomes clear the institution is failing on one or more
important dimensions of performance, and political blockage is
preventing a significant correction through ordinary
governmental processes.29 Increasingly, Sabel and Simon
argue, judges in “public law litigation” cases—typically
constitutional or statutory civil rights or civil liberties cases
seeking major institutional reforms of public schools, prisons,
criminal justice systems, social welfare programs, and the
like—recognize that they are not well-positioned to impose
comprehensive institutional reform blueprints from the bench
given the limitations of judicial competence and expertise
coupled with limitations on the courts’ ability to craft and
effectively enforce a new institutional order on a resistant,
entrenched, governmental defendant.30 So instead judges seek
27. See generally Alfred R. Light, Ecosystem Restoration in the Everglades,
14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 166 (2000) (describing how an ambitious federalstate collaborative Everglades ecosystem restoration plan emerged out of the
settlement of an acrimonious lawsuit over water quality standards which had
taxed the resources of both state and federal governments without producing
improvements in environmental quality).
28. See generally Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization
Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
29. Id. at 1062 (stating that the “prima facie case for public law
destabilization has two elements: failure to meet standards and political
blockage”).
30. Id. at 1053 (“Courts found they lacked both the information and the
depth and range of control to properly formulate and enforce command-andcontrol injunctions” which “exacerbated resistance on the part of defendants —
or at least, top-down measures had little capacity to neutralize such
resistance.”).
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to disentrench and destabilize the offending institution,
ordering its disestablishment and setting out only very general
performance standards for its reconstituted successor, leaving
the hard work of institutional redesign to the defendant
government but retaining jurisdiction to review its progress
and to order additional reforms if necessary.31 This judicially
imposed destabilization, Sabel and Simon argue, often opens
the door to creative, multiparty collaborations in the
institutional redesign and reform effort, leading to a new and
improved institutional synthesis. In short, Sabel and Simon’s
“destabilization rights” look like a judicially triggered
mechanism to get to panarchy’s back loop, where creativity
may flourish.
Citizen suits can sometimes perform a similar function in
environmental law.
Litigation—or sometimes the mere
background threat of litigation—has created legal, political,
and institutional crises that have forced parties to come
together in new and sometimes surprising reconfigurations in
the Florida Everglades, the San Francisco Bay-Delta, the
southern California coastal sage scrub, and the Pacific
Northwest, among others.
In all these cases, legal
destabilization of established ways of doing business opened
the door to a new back-loop period of creative ferment,
reorganization, and institutional innovation. The panarchy
thesis suggests that the new institutional configurations that
emerge out of this process can be expected to advance in their
turn through a normal front-loop cycle of growth, consolidation,
and predictability, eventually to become unstable and collapse
at unexpected times and in unanticipated ways into new back
loops of creative destruction.
These examples suggest an intriguing prospect: suppose we
intentionally seek to build back-loop cycles of destabilization
and back-loop reconfiguration into larger front-loop cycles of
institutional growth and consolidation? Then the inevitable
destabilization and collapse of front-loop processes need not
look so frightening or debilitating. From that perspective, the
panarchic double-loop comes to represent not the futile labor of
Sisyphus, but a recurring cyclical pattern of alternating
opportunities for back-loop creativity and front-loop
consolidation—and maybe, just maybe, the opportunity for

31. Id. at 1067-73 (describing the general outlines of experimentalist
remedies in destabilization rights cases).
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progress over time, as each turn around the double-loop
incorporates and builds on learning from past trips.
Moreover, the theory also suggests that it may be possible
to build smaller, controlled cycles of destabilization and backloop creative reconfiguration into larger scale forward-loop
processes, building toward greater order at the larger scale
while learning as we go through a series of small-scale
disturbances and innovations. That, in a sense, is what
adaptive management—as Holling originally conceived it—is
all about: creating small, controlled perturbations in the system
through carefully crafted, hypothesis-testing management
interventions, and incorporating the learning thus generated
into forward-loop incremental improvements in management at
the larger system-wide scale. Yet surely there will be largescale surprises as well, leading at times to destabilization
across the larger-scale system.
The lesson of panarchy,
however, is not to worry: change is inevitable, but back-loop
destabilization is both an inevitable part of the cycle of change,
as well as an extraordinary learning opportunity, a time when
conditions are ripest for creativity to flourish and for learning
to advance in great strides through creative recombination.
Maybe this carnival ride will be fun after all.
II. ADAPTING LAW TO ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
That brings me to J.B. Ruhl’s thoughtful and important
contribution, entitled Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is
Ruhl argues persuasively that adaptive
It Possible?.32
management is fundamentally incompatible with our present
paradigm of administrative law. It is only at the end of the
paper, however, that Ruhl finally takes a stand in favor of
modifying administrative law to accommodate adaptive
management, rather than simply concluding that adaptive
management is impossible in practice—a conclusion to which
many administrative law scholars come to far too easily, as if
administrative law were somehow immutable and eternal, or at
least of constitutional stature, rather than just another
statutory and judge-made legal artifact that may prove
maladaptive at some point.
I have no basic disagreement with Ruhl’s thesis, but I do
have a couple of comments. First, I would urge that we pay
closer attention to the forms and varieties of adaptive
32. Ruhl, supra note 10.
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management. A common theme in the scientific literature on
adaptive management is the distinction between its “passive”
and “active” forms. Carl Walters, a noted fisheries biologist,
adaptive management theorist and practitioner, and frequent
collaborator with Buzz Holling, defines “active” adaptive
management as a “deliberate probing for information” through
a multistep process involving integrative ecological modeling,
conscious generation of testable scientific hypotheses, and field
experimentation through carefully tailored management
interventions designed to test specific hypotheses.33 “Active”
adaptive management is, then, as much about harnessing
management interventions in the pursuit of science as it is
about harnessing advancing knowledge in the interest of sound
management.34
In contrast, “passive” adaptive management is a simpler
process involving heightened monitoring of key indicators,
leading to subsequent adjustments in policies in light of what
may be learned through careful observation and data
generation, and without the “deliberate probing” of active,
hypothesis-testing experimentation.35 Even “passive” adaptive
management is, in Walter’s view, far superior to old-fashioned
“trial-and-error” approaches in which the manager simply tries
out a policy thought likely to succeed and then abandons it in
favor of an alternative course of action if the first attempt
fails.36 Clearly, however, Walters sees a hierarchy of methods,
preferring “active” to “passive” adaptive management wherever
the former is possible.
It is the “passive” form of adaptive management that
appears to have gained the greatest foothold in natural
resources management, however, and that is the form to which
J.B. Ruhl refers in his paper. Ruhl offers his own rough-andready definition. The “essence” of adaptive management, he
says, is “an iterative, incremental decisionmaking process built
around a continuous process of monitoring the effects of
That
decisions and adjusting decisions accordingly.”37
definition comes very close to capturing Walters’ notion of
33. CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES
232 (1986).
34. See id. at 64, 232.
35. See id. at 232, 248-52.
36. See id. at 64 (characterizing “trial-and-error” as a process of “blind
probing” without model-building and hypothesis-testing).
37. Ruhl, supra note 10, at 28.
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“passive” adaptive management, turning as it does on
monitoring and subsequent adjustment of policies. Ruhl also
cites definitions by biologist Simon Lewin and the National
Research Council that also track the “passive” rather than the
None of these
“active” form of adaptive management.38
formulations comes close to the highly structured and
rigorously science-driven form of “active” adaptive management
advanced by Walters and Holling as a disciplined way of fieldtesting specific and carefully formulated scientific hypotheses.
As applied in the real world of natural resources
management, however, what passes under the banner of
“adaptive management” often does not even rise to the level of
“passive” adaptive management as Walters defines it. For
example, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)—
the federal agency in charge of most Endangered Species Act
implementation and enforcement—uses its own idiosyncratic
definition of “adaptive management” within its Habitat
Conservation Plan (HCP) program. FWS defines adaptive
management as consisting of a series of pre-specified
contingency measures that will be adopted at pre-specified
triggering thresholds if the initial effort fails to produce the
expected results.39 Thus, for example, an approved HCP may
specify that if the population of a protected butterfly falls below
a specified level, the landowner will be required to spend an
additional thirty percent beyond sums already irrevocably

38. See id. at 28 n.14 (citing Lewin’s definition of adaptive management);
id. (citing National Research Council description of adaptive management);
see also id. at 29 (describing an eight-step process of adaptive management);
id. at 34 (schematizing adaptive management as a four-stage continuous loop
process). “Active” adaptive management as defined by Walters would include
the development of specific, testable scientific hypotheses and the design and
implementation of management measures carefully tailored to test those
hypotheses, steps mentioned nowhere in any of the definitions or description
of adaptive management cited by Ruhl.
39. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK 3-25
(1996) (stating that adaptive management plans in HCPs should specify
triggering thresholds and “a clear understanding and agreement” as to the
“range of adjustments which might be required”); U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. &
Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the
Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting
Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,253 (June 1, 2000) (stating that if an HCP
“incorporate[s] an adaptive management strategy, it should clearly state the
range of possible operating conservation program adjustments due to
significant new information, risk, or uncertainty,” and that this range “defines
the limits of what resource commitments may be required of the permittee”).
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committed for purposes of removing additional invasive
vegetation and replanting with native vegetation. As one
commentator succinctly put it, “another word for adaptive
management” as practiced by the FWS “is ‘contingency
planning.’”40
Now contingency planning may be a step up in
sophistication from old-fashioned management by “trial-anderror” (or “muddling through”), but it does not have the open
texture, flexibility, unboundedness, and openness to surprise
and unanticipated changes contemplated by advocates of
adaptive management. Not only does it lack the scientific rigor
and experimental flavor of “active” adaptive management, but
it does not even rise to the level of “passive” adaptive
management as described by Walters. It is probably not fairly
characterized as “adaptive management” at all on most
standard definitions of that term. To use the term Ruhl
borrows from Shapiro and Glicksman,41 “contingency planning”
is at heart just a slightly more complex form of “front-end”
decisionmaking, modified only by a relatively narrow and
inflexible
range
for
“back-end”
adjustments—within
parameters specified at the front end—when certain triggering
thresholds (also specified at the front end) are met.
Contingency planning, in short, offers little opportunity for
learning and even less for rigorous scientific experimentation;
ordinarily these are much more open-textured undertakings.
Be aware, then, that when FWS says “adaptive
management,” it is using the term as an idiosyncratic term-ofart for ordinary contingency planning. When Buzz Holling and
Carl Walters use the term “adaptive management,” they mean
something very different and are generally referring to a
rigorously scientific form of “active” adaptive management,
unless they specify that they are talking about the “passive”
variety. When J.B. Ruhl and the National Research Council
use the term, they are using it in yet another sense, to mean
what Walters calls “passive” adaptive management. These
varied uses of the term invite confusion.

40. Gregory A. Thomas, Where Property Rights and Biodiversity Converge
Part III: Incorporating Adaptive Management and the Precautionary Principle
into HCP Design, 18 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, 32, 33 (2001).
41. Ruhl, supra note 10, at 30 & n.18 (citing SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO &
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC
APPROACH (2003) for the distinction between “front-end” and “back-end”
decisionmaking).

KARKKAINEN_FINAL_755.DOCFINAL

2005]

01/09/2006 12:40:59 PM

PANARCHY AND ADAPTIVE CHANGE

73

My point here is more than a mere syntactical one. We
need to be careful how we use the term “adaptive
management.” Participants in the debate over its meaning and
merits often end up talking past each other, because different
people are using the same term to mean very different things.
A little more precision is advised.
Perhaps this explains, in part, the apparent paradox that
lies at the heart of FWS’s HCP program, which professes
simultaneously to embrace both “adaptive management” and a
“no surprises” policy, the latter offering firm assurances to
landowners that more will not be demanded of them at the
“back end” than they agree to accept at the “front end” of the
planning process. FWS insists these two principles are not in
conflict. J.B. Ruhl agrees with that statement, arguing that if
the landowner agrees at the front end to an HCP containing an
adaptive management provision, that landowner cannot later
claim at the back end to be “surprised” if the learning
generated by adaptive management leads to a call for new
actions—because that is precisely what the landowner agreed
to.42 But Ruhl’s conception of (“passive”) adaptive management
is far more open-ended than FWS’s notion of adaptivemanagement-as-contingency-planning.
If
“adaptive
management” means nothing more than a limited form of
contingency planning, then adaptive management and no
surprises are obviously not in conflict, because the full range of
possible outcomes, and the conditions that will trigger each of
them, have already been fully specified at the front end. There
is no conflict, but there is also no adaptive management in the
open-ended but “passive” sense advanced by J.B. Ruhl, much
less in the “active” scientific-experimentational sense advanced
by Buzz Holling and Carl Walters. We are simply comparing
apples, oranges, and pears and calling them all “apples.”
I have no reason to question J.B. Ruhl’s larger claim that
the adversarial and litigious character of contemporary
administrative law coupled with its overall tendency toward
nitpicking enforcement of fixed “command-and-control” rules—especially procedural rules, which are singularly easy for courts
to enforce—and its reluctance to countenance uncertainty and
lack of information as the basis for agency decisionmaking are
all profoundly at odds with the very concept of adaptive
management. That strikes me as not only plausible, but very
42. See Ruhl, supra note 10, at 47-48.
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probable, and it is a very serious problem because it places law
squarely at odds with science, a very uncomfortable place for
environmental law in particular to find itself.
I do question, however, whether HCPs are the case that
best illustrates Ruhl’s point. If I am right that FWS’s crabbed
and idiosyncratic interpretation of “adaptive management” as a
narrowly circumscribed form of front-end contingency planning
should not count as true “adaptive management” at all (on
standard definitions of that term), then it appears that FWS
may never have really tried to incorporate genuine adaptive
management (as the rest of us know it) into the HCP process.
In short, HCPs are not adaptive because FWS has never really
tried to make them adaptive, and not because environmental
plaintiffs have knocked out a few HCPs on administrative law
grounds. It is premature to declare the policy experiment a
failure, because we have not yet conducted the experiment—at
least, not in the HCP context.
That does nothing to make things easier for adaptive
management, however. It only leads me to conclude that, so
far, FWS has determined it must “talk the talk” by using the
language of adaptive management to try to justify its policies to
the scientific community and other informed observers, but it
has not yet “walked the walk” by actually implementing a
meaningful form of adaptive management in practice. It is
entirely possible, though I do not know for sure, that it is not
the presence of genuine adaptive management in the cases Ruhl
describes, but rather its absence, that led to lawsuits.
In the beach mouse case, for example,43 the agency’s
position seems to have been that we genuinely do not know
what the impact of the proposed development on the protected
species will be, but we will promise only to make upward or
downward adjustments in mitigation measures within a prespecified range, whether or not adjustments in that range will
be sufficient to protect the species. In such circumstances, a
lawsuit by environmentalists claiming that the agency is not
entitled to reach a “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI)
when it has in effect admitted that there could be a significant
adverse impact on a species protected by the Endangered
Species Act seems entirely reasonable. If, on the other hand,
the HCP had incorporated a more open-ended form of adaptive
management, promising to make whatever adjustments were
43. See Ruhl, supra note 10, at 51-52 nn.98-99.
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necessary to maintain a viable population in light of what is
revealed by monitoring or scientific hypothesis testing, then the
agency would have a more plausible claim to a FONSI, and
environmentalists would presumably have less room for
complaint, either on procedural grounds or with respect to the
substantive outcome. In the agency’s calculation, however, the
No Surprises principle trumps genuine adaptive management;
No Surprises is compatible only with the faux adaptivemanagement-as-limited-contingency-planning that the agency
idiosyncratically advocates, and it is the application of that
policy that both inspires the environmentalists’ distrust and
invites their lawsuit.
My second point is briefer. J.B. Ruhl argues that we are
still a long way from drafting a National Adaptive Management
Act.44 That is surely right, but merely raising the idea is a
positive contribution. After all, adaptive management is at
bottom a set of procedural principles—simultaneously a method
of inquiry and a procedural mechanism of agency
decisionmaking, based on rigorous observation through
monitoring (“passive”) and experimentation (“active”),
reassessment, and adjustment in light of what is learned. It
also requires a particular kind of justification—scientific
justification based on integrative cross-disciplinary modeling
and monitoring data—for changes in policies and
implementation measures. In principle, at least, it does not
seem so very difficult a prospect to reduce those procedures and
modes of justification to a set of administrative law principles
aimed at providing the transparency, accountability, and
“objective boundaries” that are currently lacking. To be sure,
those legal principles will diverge from the familiar
administrative law principles that we have all come to know
and love, or in some cases to loathe. But that does seem a
manageable task. One might even envision administrative law
proceeding on two tracks: ordinarily the familiar “fixed rule”
track will apply, except in circumstances where the agency can
justify, according to well-understood standards, shifting to the
adaptive management track, and at that point a second set of
adaptive management administrative law principles would kick
in, requiring different procedures and further justifications for
changes in the course of action.
It all sounds a bit
bureaucratic, but perhaps that is the price we must pay to
44. Id. at 54.
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reconcile science and law. Thoughtful, scientifically attuned
lawyers like J.B. Ruhl will surely have a central role to play in
working this all out, but it strikes me as a valuable and
exciting project.
Ruhl makes a further contribution, introducing the
concepts of “volatility” and “drift” to set some outer boundaries
on back-end adjustments that would escape “obtrusive public
participation and judicial review.”45 This is a creative and
novel suggestion, worthy of careful consideration. My initial
reaction, though, is a bit skeptical. Ruhl would confine early
changes in position to a narrow range (to constrain volatility),
gradually expanding the permissible range of volatility over
time, until an outer maximum range of permissible deviation
from the initial position is reached (to constrain drift). This
appears to leave room for much larger lurches in position as
one proceeds outward in time from the starting point. It is not
clear, however why large changes are more acceptable if they
occur later in time, rather than early. In the beach mouse case,
for example, suppose early monitoring results indicate that the
initial course of action is causing dramatic declines in the
species, requiring early large-scale management adjustments to
prevent ecological disaster. Those kinds of problems might just
as plausibly show up early as late. On the other hand, if
management is maintaining a steady course for a long period of
time, it might suggest that whatever management measures
are being pursued are actually working fairly well. From that
perspective, large deviations from a long-established and
apparently successful course of management action look every
bit as suspicious as earlier ones, and should be entitled to no
more deference.
On the other hand, ecological science has proven itself
capable of generating very large surprises at any time.
Sometimes we come to appreciate that our actions have been
predicated upon very basic misunderstandings of ecosystem
dynamics, necessitating large-scale corrections. There is no
particular reason to think those kinds of lurching advances in
science will come sooner, or later, in the process. Genuine
adaptive management is almost certain to be somewhat
volatile, but unpredictably so as to when volatility will be
required, if we give it a chance to work. Nor is “drift” outside
predetermined parameters necessarily a bad thing, if it is
45. See id. at 55-56.
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predicated upon real advances in scientific understanding. So
it is a little hard to see just what is added by using the concepts
of “drift” and “volatility” as the basis for determining when to
allow citizen participation and judicial review, however creative
and intuitively appealing the concepts may be.
At bottom, I suspect all this goes to the question of what
counts as justification. The question is not how much do we
want to allow agencies to depart from an initial course of
action, because we cannot presume that a smaller departure is
the sounder course of action, or that only small departures are
justifiable early but larger departures are necessarily
justifiable later. The question is when do we want to allow
such departures, of whatever magnitude. The answer, in
general, is when the departures are justified by advances in
scientific understanding. That is what adaptive management
is all about, and that is the principle to which we must make
administrative law adapt if we are to bring environmental law
and policy into congruence with contemporary ecological
science.

